



Incident reference No: 906/14

RESOLUTION OF THE STATE COMMISSION ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION

On 3 December 2014, after reopening of investigation, the Commission again examined circumstances of the air occurrence involving Boeing 737-400 airplane which was found on 23 June 2014, during scheduled maintenance in a certified maintenance organization. The circumstances were forwarded by the certified maintenance organization The State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation, acting under **Article 5 par. 3 of the Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC¹** considered the information contained in the occurrence notification and additional documents forwarded by the sender as sufficient and decided to conclude the investigation.

Information/Report on the occurrence

Course and circumstances of the occurrence:

During the planned replacement of landing gear, after removing the left main landing gear, maintenance personnel found corrosion on the part named: LH MLG WALKING (ACTUATOR) BEAM, P/N 65-46108-21, S/N 744. The corrosion was covered with a thick, exfoliated layer of paint and a layer of rubber sealant (gray RTV). The part belongs to the rotating assembly of the landing gear and is a property of the AEM LIMITED (UK) repair organization. It was installed on the airplane on 1 February, 2014. Condition of the corrosion shows that the sealant and the paint at this place could have been applied before the last installation on the airplane. The certified maintenance organization informed the Commission about the occurrence by sending Technical Occurrence Report, SCAAI reference No. 2014.22.



Part identification.



Place of application of sealant and paint.

¹EU Journal of Laws L. 2010.295.35



The same place after removal of paint and sealant - clearly visible corrosion on the part surface.

Exfoliated portion of the sealant with a layer of paint, "masking" corroded surface of the part.

Cause of the air occurrence:

An attempt to hide the part defect or to effect its unauthorized repair in unknown circumstances outside the organization of the notification sender.

Preventive actions taken by the notification sender:

1. Notification of operator about the occurrence;
2. Forwarding information about the occurrence to managers of service areas to inform the staff;
3. Forwarding information about the occurrence to the Section of Technical Personnel Training for the use during refresher training in the fields of human factor and aircraft type.

The Commission has not formulated any safety recommendations.

Commission Comment:

The Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accident Investigation will notify the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (UK) by sending to its address this Resolution translated into English.

Signature of the Investigator-in-Charge

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