



**Incident reference No: 1752/14**

**RESOLUTION  
OF  
THE STATE COMMISSION ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION**

On 17 December 2014, the Commission examined information on circumstances of the air occurrence involving two Boeing 737-800 airplanes (B738), which occurred in CTR of Poznań-Ławica (EPP0) aerodrome on 21 September 2014. The information was submitted by the Air Navigation Service Provider and the airplanes operator. The State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation, acting under **Article 5 par. 3 of the Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC<sup>1</sup>** accepted the findings of the above mentioned entities and decided to conclude the investigation.

**Course and circumstances of the occurrence:**

Three aircraft were involved in the occurrence: P180, which landed on runway 28 (RWY 28); B738 taxiing for takeoff from RWY 28 and B738 approaching for a landing.

After landing of the P180, B738 located at that time near the holding point “Alpha” and taxiing for takeoff, received TWR Controller’s instruction: “Line up”. The crew commenced to execute this instruction and a few seconds later the TWR Controller issued the instruction: “Hold short”. The crew executed also this instruction and informed the TWR Controller: “We have already entered” (the crew meant: we crossed the stop bar). The TWR controller did not understand this transmission, so the pilot repeated: “We have already entered the runway” and due to the lack of acknowledgement of receipt from the TWR he said: “We are already on the runway, Ryanair 11TA”. This was confirmed by the TWR Controller: “Roger now I understand”.

Then the TWR Controller issued instructions for P180 leaving the Runway and cleared for landing B738 which was on the glide path.

Having heard this transmission the pilot of B738 waiting short of RWY28 established communication with the crew of the landing B738 and informed them of his position relative to the RWY. The crew of the landing B738, being on final of visual approach, approximately 2,5 NM to threshold, with visual reference to the Runway, decided to continue the landing.

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<sup>1</sup>EU Journal of Laws L. 2010.295.35

## **FINDINGS**

1. “Runway Incursion” occurred in this incident when the B738 crossed the holding line short of RWY 28. It was caused by the fact that the TWR Controller issued clearance to enter RWY 28 and later cancelled the clearance. After this occurrence there was no action by the Poznań TWR Controller to resolve the conflict, and B738 received the clearance for landing.
2. This clearance ultimately led to landing on an occupied RWY, which was initially categorized by the SCAAI as a “Serious Incident”. This categorization was consistent with Attachment C to ICAO Annex 13. During analysis of the occurrence, in accordance with Article 9 par. 2 of the SCAAI Rules of Procedure the occurrence category was changed into “Incident”.
3. It is inexplicable why the repeated reports of the B738 flight crew on crossing the holding line were not understood by the TWR Controller and even when finally it was verbally confirmed as understood, it was ultimately ignored by the lack of any reaction.
4. The course of the occurrence shows that the TWR Controller was totally not aware of the existing hazard. This is demonstrated by the fact that after the occurrence the “Runway Incursion” form was not filled in and the incident was not reported in Electronic Report of Shift Manager.
5. Faced with the hazard and lack of reaction from the Poznań TWR, the flight crews of B738 airplanes took the initiative to communicate with each other, omitting the TWR Controller.
6. The crews of both aircraft reported the incident on “Safety Alert Initial Reports” forms.
7. The duty period of the TWR Controller involved in the incident did not exceed the applicable standards.
8. The involved TWR Controller received the Air Traffic Controller Licence (ADI rating) in 1981. On the day of the occurrence he had valid ADI rating and valid Aero-Medical Certificate. In the period from 18 to 22 March 2013 he attended a refresher course on emergency situations.

### **Cause of the air occurrence:**

Errors in ATM work.

### **Preventive actions taken by the investigating entity:**

## **Air Navigation Service Provider**

1. Forward the Final Report and the collected multimedia materials to the Office of Air Traffic Services to consider sending the involved EPPO TWR Controller for additional refresher training for the airport controllers.

Until 31 December 2014 the Office of Air Traffic Services will inform AB about its decisions and actions.

2. Forward the Final Report and the collected multimedia materials to the Local Team of Poznań Airport Control to organize meeting with the involved Controller and the Local Safety Manager of EPPO TWR. The aim of the meeting should be familiarization of the Controller with the Report to limit the possibility of a similar occurrence in the future.

Until 31 December 2014 the Head of the Local Team of Poznań Airport Control will inform AB about its actions.

3. Forward the Final Report and the collected multimedia materials to the Aviation Training Center to include them into the database of investigated occurrences for use by the Center instructors during basic and refresher training for air traffic controllers.
4. The Investigation Team of ATM occurrences will prepare information for B738 user on conclusion of the investigation and its findings.
5. Another case of aircraft landing on an occupied runway and the growing trend of such occurrences in 2013-2014. The Department of Monitoring and Safety Inspections to perform a detailed analysis of landings on occupied runways in 2013-2014. Based on the analysis the offices of AL/AR/AP to develop and implement a corrective program covering the entire process, from training to operations supervision.

**The Commission has not formulated any safety recommendations.**

Signature of the Investigator-in-Charge

*signature on the original Resolution*