



**State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation**  
**INCYDENT 2019/3602**  
**RESOLUTION**  
**of 28<sup>th</sup> August 2023**

<b>Type and model of aircraft:</b>	Airplane, Ikarus C42
<b>Registration marks:</b>	D-MULZ
<b>Date of occurrence:</b>	14 <sup>th</sup> July 2019
<b>Place of occurrence:</b>	FIS Gdańsk, CTR EPGD, TMA Gdańsk

After reviewing the final report on the investigation and the collected documentation presented by the investigating entity, pursuant to Article 135 of The Act of 3rd July 2002 – Aviation Law (with later amendments) and § 18 of the Regulation of Minister of Transport of 18 January 2007 on air accidents and incidents, the State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation determined that:

**1. The course of the occurrence was as follows:**

On 14.07.2019, an Ikarus C42 airplane, with markings D-MULZ (hereinafter referred to as "Ikarus"), performed a flight from Anklam airfield (EDCA, Germany) to Lech Walesa Airport Gdansk (EPGD). The crew flew according to VFR<sup>1</sup> in the FIS<sup>2</sup> Gdansk airspace from the west towards EPGD airport.

Until reaching the traverse of the town of Slupsk, there was no indications of any difficulties that might arise. From this position, the Ikarus aircraft began to deviate from the route leading to the destination airport. The FISO<sup>3</sup> took note of this and began providing the crew with additional information about zone activity near the flight route and suggested maintaining the correct course. As time passed, the FISO got the impression that the Ikarus flight crew was getting more and more lost. The FISO spent more and more time providing information necessary to navigate the airplane toward the destination airport. It soon became apparent that the crew did not understand most of the transmissions and was either incorrectly confirming their reception or not confirming them at all. The FISO tried to use the simplest possible messages and repeated the relevant information two or three times in each transmission to make it easier for the crew to understand and to make sure the information was received.

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<sup>1</sup> VFR – Visual Flight Rules

<sup>2</sup> FIS – Flight Information Service

<sup>3</sup> FISO – FIS Officer

While the Ikarus airplane crew was conducting radio communication, another voice was also heard prompting what to say.

After arriving at the ZULU point of the EPGD airport, the Ikarus airplane was transferred to communications to the EPGD TWR<sup>4</sup>. The maneuvers of the airplane were unpredictable, and communication with its crew was very difficult. For this reason, the TWR controller asked the APP<sup>5</sup> controller to delay the approach of the commercial airliner arriving at EPGD airport until he was sure that the Ikarus airplane was making a flight toward the airport with the intention of landing. When the Ikarus airplane was in close proximity to the airport, the crew of the airplane continued the approach, and the delay lasted a few minutes.

The TWR controller gave instructions to fly via VFR points, but the crew did not follow them. Eventually, the TWR controller instructed the crew to fly toward EPGD airport, giving the correct direction. An agreement was reached after several unsuccessful attempts. The Ikarus plane landed at 16:32 hrs<sup>6</sup>.

The route of the last hour of the flight was very chaotic. During this time, both FISO and TWR controller used all possibilities to provide information as simply as possible in order to bring the airplane to land. Dozens of transmissions in English were carried out, most of which were not understood by the airplane crew.

The Ikarus airplane twice climbed above 1,800 ft AMSL<sup>7</sup> while flying into the TMA<sup>8</sup> Gdansk controlled airspace. After receiving caution, the crew decreased the altitude.

**2. Cause of the occurrence:**

**Inappropriate preparation of the crew to perform visual flight in FIR Warsaw and for conducting radio communications in English.**

**3. Contributing factors:**

Not defined.

**4. The Commission accepted the following preventive measures proposed by the operator:**

Not formulated.

**5. In addition, the Commission has proposed the following safety recommendations:**

Not formulated.

**Investigator-in-Charge**

**PKBWL Chairman**

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(signature on original only)

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(signature on original only)

<sup>4</sup> TWR – Aerodrome control tower

<sup>5</sup> APP – Approach control service

<sup>6</sup> Time in Resolution is exprimed in LMT = UTC +2 h

<sup>7</sup> AMSL – Above Mean Sea Level

<sup>8</sup> TMA – Terminal control area